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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43349 
      ) 
v.      ) BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2010-721 
      ) 
ROBERT TALLEY,    )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Robert Talley was sentenced to a five year fixed term of imprisonment after he 
pled guilty to being an accessory to burglary.  Following the revocation of his probation, 
the district court executed the original sentence.  Mr. Talley contends the district court 
abused its discretion by revoking his probation and executing the original sentence. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Talley pled guilty to being an accessory to burglary, and was sentenced to a 
term of five years fixed.  (R. Vol. I, pp.192-195; R. Vol. II, pp.253-59.)  The district court 
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suspended execution of the sentence and placed Mr. Talley on probation for a period of 
three years, commencing on August 31, 2010.  (R. Vol. II, pp.253-59.)   
In December 2010, Mr. Talley’s supervision was transferred to Washington.  
(R. Vol. II, p.268.)  Mr. Talley was alleged to have violated probation in Washington on 
October 20, 2011, by absconding supervision, failing to make payments toward his 
court-ordered financial obligations, and committing the offenses of driving with a 
suspended license, interlock ignition violation, and possession of brass knuckles and 
burglary tools.  (R. Vol. II, pp.302-04.)  He admitted to these violations and was placed 
back on probation on July 13, 2012.  (R. Vol. II, pp.360-63.) 
Mr. Talley was alleged to have violated probation for a second time on 
October 31, 2012, by absconding supervision and committing the offense of money 
laundering.1  (R. Vol. II, pp.365-66; R. Vol. III, pp.455-56.)  Mr. Talley admitted to the 
violations and, on April 22, 2013, the district court entered an order revoking Mr. Talley’s 
probation, executing the original sentence and retaining jurisdiction for a period of 365 
days.  (R. Vol. III, pp.459-61, 463.)  In its order revoking probation, the district court 
stated it was executing the original sentence of three years, with one year fixed.  
(R. Vol. III, p.460.)  This was not the original sentence.  Before the district court noticed 
its error, Mr. Talley came before the court and requested that it relinquish jurisdiction.  
(R. Vol. III, p.541.)  The court granted this request.  (R. Vol. III, p.541.)  The court 
subsequently noticed its error and changed the order revoking probation to reflect that it 
                                            
1 The amended probation violation report originally alleged that Mr. Talley violated 
probation by committing the offense of burglary, but the offense was changed to money 
laundering by handwritten notation.  (R. Vol. III, pp.233-34.) 
 3 
was executing the original sentence of five years.2  (See R. Vol. III, pp.540-45.)  The 
court held a hearing on August 20, 2013, and allowed Mr. Talley to reconsider his 
request to relinquish jurisdiction in light of its mistake.  (See R. Vol. III, pp.540-45.)  
Mr. Talley requested that the court retain jurisdiction and the court allowed him to 
participate in a rider.3  (R. Vol. III, pp.479-82.)   
On December 19, 2013, the district court entered a judgment and disposition on 
jurisdictional review following Mr. Talley’s successful completion of his rider.4  (R. Vol. 
III, pp.551-53.)  This judgment reflects that the district court relinquished jurisdiction 
over Mr. Talley, executed the original sentence of five years, suspended that sentence 
and placed Mr. Talley on probation for a period of three years.  (R. Vol. III, pp.551-53.) 
 A probation violation report was filed on January 16, 2015, alleging that 
Mr. Talley violated his probation by committing theft of a motor vehicle, driving with a 
suspended/revoked license and failing to make payments toward his court-ordered 
financial obligations.  (R. Vol. III, pp.568-69.)  The offender violation report reflects that 
Mr. Talley absconded supervision in Washington on July 11, 2014, and stole his foster-
father’s car.  (R. Vol. III, p.572.)  A hearing was held on June 1, 2015, and Mr. Talley 
                                            
2 Mr. Talley filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for 
reconsideration of sentence, arguing that the district court’s order executing the three 
year sentence became final 42 days after it was filed and could not subsequently be 
changed.  (R. Vol. III, pp.505-06.)  The court rejected this argument and denied 
Mr. Talley’s Rule 35 motion in an order dated November 21, 2013.  (R. Vol. III, pp.540-
45.) 
3 Mr. Talley filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment on probation violation 
retaining jurisdiction, but subsequently dismissed his appeal.  (R. Vol. III, pp.485-87, 
499-504, 559-63.)   
4 This judgment states that Mr. Talley was originally convicted of being an accessory to 
willfully withholding, concealing or harboring a felony.  (R. Vol. III, p.551.)  This is 
incorrect.  Mr. Talley was originally convicted of being an accessory to burglary.  
(R. Vol. I, pp.253-59; Tr. p.10 Ls.15-18.) 
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admitted to driving with a suspended license and failing to make payments toward his 
financial obligations.  (R. Vol. III, p.643.)  He did not admit to theft of a motor vehicle, but 
admitted that he had pled guilty to money laundering in Washington.  (R. Vol. III, p.643; 
Tr. p.5, L.20 – p.6, L.21.)  The district court continued the disposition hearing because it 
needed time to review the case.  (Tr. p.11, Ls.10-19.)  At the continued disposition 
hearing, the district court executed the original sentence of five years.5  (R. Vol. III, 




Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Talley’s probation and 
executed the original sentence of five years? 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Talley’s Probation And 
ExecutedThe Original Sentence Of Five Years 
 
The district court has discretion to revoke probation after a violation has been 
proven.  State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).  However, “[a] judge cannot 
revoke probation arbitrarily.”  State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989).  “In 
determining whether to revoke probation, evidence of the defendant’s conduct before 
and during probation may be considered.”  Roy, 113 Idaho at 392.  “[P]robation may be 
revoked if the judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation 
                                            
5 This judgment states that Mr. Talley was originally convicted of being an accessory to 
willfully withholding, concealing or harboring a felony.  (R. Vol. III, p.551.)  This is 
incorrect.  Mr. Talley was originally convicted of being an accessory to burglary.  
(R. Vol. I, pp.253-59; Tr. p.10 Ls.15-18.) 
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is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose.”  Lee, 116 Idaho at 40; see also State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995) (“In determining whether to revoke probation 
a court must consider whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while 
also providing adequate protection for society.”). 
Here, the district court abused its direction when it revoked Mr. Talley’s probation 
because it was meeting the objective of rehabilitation while providing adequate 
protection for society.  The district court revoked Mr. Talley’s probation and executed a 
sentence of five years fixed after Mr. Talley pled guilty to money laundering.  (State’s 
Ex. 3.)  It does not appear that there was a factual basis for this plea and the district 
court did not inquire into the matter at the revocation hearing.  Mr. Talley was originally 
charged with stealing a vehicle—specifically, his foster father’s car—but he consistently 
denied committing a crime and stated he had permission to use the vehicle.  (R. Vol. III, 
p.577; Tr. p.22, Ls.14-21.)  Mr. Talley informed the court at the revocation hearing that 
he did not challenge the charge of theft because of his criminal history, but instead 
agreed to plead guilty to money laundering.  (Tr. p.23, Ls.3-8.)  He explained that his 
foster dad “did finally come to court and tell the truth [that he had given Mr. Talley 
permission to use his car].”  (Tr. p.24, Ls.1-3.)  On these facts, Mr. Talley’s plea to 
money laundering does not warrant the revocation of his probation.  
The district court did not need to revoke Mr. Talley’s probation and execute the 
original sentence in order to provide adequate protection for society.  Mr. Talley 
explained at the revocation hearing that he wanted to participate in a year-long, faith-
based “teen challenge” program in Washington.  (Tr. p.24, L.14 – p.25, L.20.)  He also 
explained that he had been seeing a psychologist to help with mental health issues.  
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(Tr. p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.2.)  In light of these facts, and the circumstances surrounding 
his probation violation, the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Talley’s 
probation and executing the original sentence.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Talley respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order 
revoking his probation and place him back on probation.  Alternatively, he requests that 
the Court remand this case to the district court for a new disposition hearing. 
 DATED this 22nd day of December, 2015. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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